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Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of organizational culture and personal values on performance under
individual and team contest incentives. We develop a model of regard for others and in-group fa-
voritism that predicts interaction eﬀects between organizational values and personal values in contest
games. These predictions are tested in a computerized lab experiment with exogenous control of
both organizational values and incentives. In line with our theoretical model we ﬁnd that prosocial
(proself) orientated subjects exert more (less) eﬀort in team contests in the primed prosocial orga-
nizational values condition, relative to the neutrally primed baseline condition. Further, when the
prosocial organizational values are combined with individual contest incentives, prosocial subjects no
longer outperform their proself counterparts. These ﬁndings provide a ﬁrst, aﬃrmative, causal test
of person-organization ﬁt theory. They also suggest the importance of a 'triple-ﬁt' between personal
preferences, organizational values and incentive mechanisms for prosocially orientated individuals.
Keywords: tournaments; organizational culture; personal values; person-organization ﬁt; teams;
economic incentives
JEL: C91, D02, D23, J33, M52
1 Introduction
A long tradition in organizational research on person-organization ﬁt supports the notion that employees
whose values align with those of their organization are more productive, engage more in organizational
citizenship behavior, and are more committed to the organization (e.g., Hoﬀman and Woehr, 2006;
Verquer, Beehr and Wagner, 2003; Schneider, 1987). Erez and Earley (1993) and Gerhart (2009) among
others argue that personal preferences, organizational culture, and management practices interact and
aﬀect work behavior and performance. This view suggests that the beneﬁts of the ﬁt between personal and
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organizational values could be reinforced by adopting well-suited management practices, most notably
the compensation schemes of employees.
Economists for their part have intensively studied the eﬀects of compensation schemes on performance
(Prendergast 1999; Lazear, 1999; Harbing and Irlenbusch, 2011). Yet, the potential moderating eﬀect
of person-organization ﬁt has received little attention, presumably because of the believed elusiveness
of identiﬁable variation in organizational values and the lack of behavioral incentivized measures of
value-related preferences on which economists traditionally focus. Nevertheless, there is a rising interest,
especially among experimental economists, in studying the impact of culture, including corporate culture,
on economic outcomes (Weber and Camerer, 2003; Kosfeld and von Siemens, 2011; van den Steen, 2010).
Even the question of matching the right kind of personalities with the right projects and ﬁrms is receiving
both theoretical and experimental attention (Besley and Ghatak, 2005, 2013).
In this paper, we attempt to identify a causal eﬀect of person-organization value ﬁt. In particular,
we develop arguments that organizations need to align incentive schemes both with organizational values
and with employee personal values to optimally motivate employee performance.
Firstly, we use the values of universalism and benevolence to characterize prosocial cultures, and we
use the values of power and achievement to characterize proself cultures (see Schwartz 1992, 2007). To
formalize mathematically the impact of personal and organizational values on performance, we advance a
variant of the model by Chen and Li (2009), which features diﬀerential regard for others in the in-group
and in the out-group, beﬁtting a setting where teams compete to win a prize (a team contest game, see
Orrison et al. 2004). This mathematical model of regard for others captures the distinction between
the prosocial values of benevolence (regard for the in-group) and universalism (regard for general others)
in the Schwartz (1992, 2007) personal value classiﬁcation. Our game-theoretical model predicts inter-
action eﬀects between speciﬁc conﬁgurations of prosocial or proself organizational values and personal
values on performance. We then conduct a controlled laboratory experiment where we use an innovative
priming procedure to simulate organizational values in the laboratory. We measure individuals' personal
value orientation and other-regarding preferences and study the eﬀects of primed organizational values
on individual eﬀort in the team contests for other- and self-regarding individuals. The design allows for
the identiﬁcation of a causal eﬀect of the ﬁt between personal and organizational values on performance
in team contests. In line with the theoretical model, we ﬁnd that prosocial individuals react diﬀer-
ently to prosocial organizational values than their proself oriented counterparts. In particular, prosocial
individuals exert more eﬀort in an organizational culture that matches their preferences. In contrast,
proself-oriented individuals exert less eﬀort in prosocial organizational cultures.
There are two interrelated reasons for the focus on team contests. First, relative performance schemes
are found in the majority of hierarchical organizations (Bull et al., 1987; Baker et al., 1988) and several
studies report evidence of the increasing importance of team incentives. Ledford (1995), for instance,
shows that team incentives are present in the majority of US ﬁrms. Lazear and Shaw (2007) point out
that since the late 1990's, teamwork has become prevalent in many large ﬁrms; even in academia, team
incentives are receiving more attention (Wuchty et al., 2007). Second, previous evidence suggests that
organizational values supportive of consideration for others may particularly facilitate team eﬀectiveness
(Mathieu et al., 2008). Hence, we speciﬁcally primed a supportive, prosocially-oriented culture by priming
prosocial values such as benevolence and universalism, which we contrast with a proself-oriented culture
by priming proself values such as achievement and power (see Schwartz, 1992). We also introduce a
neutral control condition where subjects receive a non-associative prime. Primes were designed building
on Schwartz's theory of human values (Schwartz, 1992) and using well-established supraliminal priming
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techniques (e.g. Bargh and Chartrand, 2000). To our knowledge, organizational values have not been
examined in economic experiments to date.
Regarding personal value orientation, we pre-measure prosocial preferences using a battery of incen-
tivized behavioral measures such as the dictator game transfer (the subject divides a sum of money
between himself/herself and an anonymous recipient). For robustness checks, we also include the trust
game backtransfer and the ultimatum game acceptance threshold (Camerer, 2003). We also use a psycho-
logical self-report measure, the Personal Value Questionniare (PVQ) survey tool (Schwartz et al., 2001).
With exogenous control of organizational values and incentives, and knowledge of individual pro-sociality,
we can study which match of personal characteristics and organizational values induces the highest eﬀort
in the competing teams contest.
The priming method that we employ to proxy organizational values has also been applied in psycholog-
ical studies on the impact of both personal and national cultural values (e.g., Maio et al., 2009; Oyserman
and Lee, 2008; Oyserman, 2011). Organizational values, for their part, are widely accepted as a core
element of organizational cultures (Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Hofstede, 1985;
O'Reilly et al., 1991) and value congruence is the dominant dimension along which person-organization
ﬁt is evaluated (e.g. Hoﬀman and Woehr, 2006; O'Reilly et al., 1991). However, within management and
organizational psychology, there is only limited research that investigates priming and subconscious goals
in the workplace and their eﬀect on work-related outcomes such as expenditure of eﬀort in a performance
task. The only workplace-related research using priming investigated how (certain picture) primes lead to
the subconscious activation of primed goals (typically achievement), which subsequently have an impact
on performance (e.g. call center agents being more successful in fundraising; e.g. Shantz and Latham,
2009). However, our theoretical model leads us to prefer value primes over pictures as primes as we
speciﬁcally hypothesize person-organization value-ﬁt as the key mechanism in our experiment.
The procedure for priming organizational culture used in this study is justiﬁed for a number of reasons.
First, notwithstanding that researchers use primes to prime personal or national culture values, they
agree that primes are situational stimuli which temporarily enhance the accessibility of individual values.
Our argument is that outside the lab, within an organization, organizational values act as situational
stimuli that members of an organization are exposed to and which prime their personal values. Second,
although we are unaware of other studies using value primes to prime organizational culture, they have
been used to prime national culture (e.g. Oyserman, 2011). National and organizational culture, albeit
not identical, bear strong similarities and are closely interlinked (House et al., 2004). We attribute
the lack of past research using priming to simulate the eﬀects of organizational values to the fact that
priming and experimental research, more generally, is rare in management or organizational psychology.
Past priming research has predominantly been conducted by social psychologists who are not concerned
with exploring organizational values; this contrasts with management and organizational researchers for
whom organizational values are an important concept. Finally, the use of value primes, more generally,
is consistent with the literature on organizational culture, which emphasizes values as a core aspect of
organizational culture (e.g., Ashkanasy et al., 2000; Cameron and Quinn, 2011; Hofstede, 1995; O'Reilly
et al., 1991).
A further novelty of our research is that we bridge the person-organization ﬁt literature with the
economic literature on the eﬀects of incentives on performance (Prendergast, 1999) and the related
literature on pay for performance in management (e.g., Gerhart et al., 2009). In other words, we study the
importance of ﬁtting a third dimension, the right incentive structure, with congruing personal preferences
and organizational values. To study this, we run a set of complementary experiments to the ones described
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above where individuals instead of teams compete to win a prize. This is done in a controlled manner
keeping much of the structure (in particular the game theoretic self-regarding and risk-neutral Nash-
equilibrium prediction) from team competition intact, yet dropping the teams structure as in Orrison
at al. (2004). Under this incentive structure, we ﬁnd that the link between prosocial individuals and a
prosocial organizational values vanishes. This ﬁnding extends person-organization ﬁt theory by pointing
to the importance of a 'triple-ﬁt' of personal preferences, organizational values and incentive mechanisms
for those who are prosocially oriented.
Despite an impressive existing literature, empirical research on the beneﬁts of the ﬁt between personal
preferences, organizational values, and management practices has been to date impeded by at least four
factors. First, organizational culture is often operationalized as an overarching concept that embraces
both organizational values and human resource management practices, which does not allow us to identify
any potential interaction eﬀects. However, a mismatch between organizational culture and management
practices, as is often evident during organizational change processes or mergers, may have particularly
severe performance implications and thus warrants investigation. Second, organizational values and
compensation schemes are most likely to be correlated, such that organizations adopt compensation
schemes that are consistent with their values. The lack of exogenous and independent variation impedes
causal identiﬁcation and might explain why there are no studies exploiting happenstance data. Third,
even though person-organization ﬁt theory is widely acknowledged in management research (e.g. Edwards,
2008), it is mainly supported by correlational evidence. To the best of our knowledge, we provide a ﬁrst
causal test where organizational values and compensation schemes vary exogenously and independently.
Finally, management researchers and economists alike often search for universally eﬀective management
practices - across countries, industries and organizations (e.g. Bloom and van Reenen, 2010). However,
organizational cultures are inﬂuenced by national cultures as are the preferences of individuals (e.g.,
House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1992). Thus, it seems worthwhile to investigate whether one size indeed ﬁts
all or whether management practices may be diﬀerentially eﬀective, depending on organizational values
and individual preferences.
In principle, the method of controlled experimentation that we exploit has the capacity of overcoming
all these challenges if the experimental proxies for incentive schemes and organizational values do not
compromise external validity. While lab-experimental studies can be criticized for relying heavily on
the extrapolation from the lab to the ﬁeld, experimentation in general has the decisive advantage of
direct control which allows for strong causal conclusions. Moreover, the concerns for external validity
might be mitigated by the remark that if any eﬀect can be identiﬁed in our laboratory setting with a
very weak notion of teams, incentives, and culture, then the eﬀect is also likely to be of importance in
environments where the group, performance management schemes and organizational values are more
vividly and concretely present.1 The experimental teams and individual contests, on the one hand, and
the priming method, on the other, provide novel tools to proxy incentives and organizational values and
thus to study their causal eﬀects. Happenstance exogenous variation in organizational values is rare and
thus, laboratory settings provide an interesting complementary avenue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related studies in more depth to
highlight how we complement the existing literature. Section 3 gives a theoretical overview by presenting
1As in the classic minimal group paradigm (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) our group assignment is anonymous. In contrast
to the minimal group paradigm, where preferences over two paintings determines the group assigment and there are no
payoﬀ interdependencies, group assignment is here randomized and the participants engage in strategic interaction with
payoﬀ interdependencies. In our setup, the payoﬀ externality is positive towards the in-groups and negative towards the
out-groups.
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the contest game, values and priming theory, and the application of the model of Chen and Li (2009) to
value priming in the teams contest. Section 4 explains the experimental set-up. Section 5 contains the
experimental analysis while Section 6 discusses the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Related literature
In this section, we present related studies from diﬀerent disciplines to underscore the interdisciplinary
nature of our work and to exemplify how we diﬀer, complement, and draw from the existing literature. We
ﬁrst motivate our focus on tournament incentives. Next, we highlight the speciﬁc nature of tournaments
relative to other game structures. Then, we discuss related experimental work on organizational culture
and cooperation.
Individual relative performance incentives reward those who perform best as compared to other in-
dividuals in an organization. Due to internal promotion, such practices are implicitly present in most
organizations. While Matsumura and Shin (2006) ﬁnd such incentive schemes to be generally eﬀective,
the authors note that a sense of unfairness by the employees diminishes their eﬀectiveness. In particular
and as suggested by ﬁeld evidence (Bandiera et al., 2005), relative individual evaluation may render the
performance of close-knit groups suboptimal if other-regarding group members internalize the negative
externality of their eﬀort on others.2 Measuring the aggregate performance within small teams and re-
warding teams relative to the performance of other teams may help alleviate the problem (Orrison et al.,
2004; Nalbantian and Schotter, 1997; Hamilton et al., 2003; Eckel and Grossman, 2005). Indeed, team
incentives induce a positive externality of eﬀort on fellow team members countervailing the negative ex-
ternality on the members of the competing team. In this setting, the intra-team positive externality may
well more than oﬀset the inter-team negative externality. More speciﬁcally, team-members with particu-
larly strong benevolence values (Schwartz 1992, 2007) will arguably tend to be nicer to the members of
their in-group than their out-group (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; Chen and Li, 2009) or may even be hostile
to their out-group as in parochial altruism (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Rand et al., 2009).
It is important to analyze both competition and cooperation at the workplace as they are not neces-
sarily polar opposites. The strategic nature of contests (e.g., Shreremeta, 2011) diﬀers from that of social
dilemmas and public good games in three respects. First, in order to cooperate in contests, contestants
should collude and refrain from exerting eﬀort so that prizes can be won at a lower cost. Second, in
contest games, it is in each participant's private interest to contribute resources to the race. Finally, con-
tributing more than the private optimum undermines both the total and the private surplus. Increasing
one's contribution marginally generates a negative externality on other contestants (or members of other
teams). There is, however, a positive externality beneﬁting one's own team-mates in the teams contest.
Sagiv et al. (2011) study a setting where individuals cooperate in a social dilemma game, on the
one hand, and where teams compete in threshold-public-good production, on the other hand. They ﬁnd
evidence that universalism and benevolence values as opposed to achievement and power values promote
both individual cooperation and within-team cooperation. Yet, as pointed out above, our contest games
reﬂecting two alternative competitive incentive schemes signiﬁcantly diﬀer from dilemma and public goods
games. Group optima in contests diﬀer qualitatively from group optima in social dilemmas. Whilst classic
2In related research, Bandiera et al. (2010) conduct a ﬁeld experiment to investigate the eﬀect of social ties to other
workers on productivity under absolute performance measures. They ﬁnd that overall, there is a positive eﬀect of social
ties on aggregate productivity.
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public good provision is often crucial at many work places, we believe that our contest games are equally
important in understanding strategic features of work place incentives.
There are few related experimental studies investigating organizational culture and cooperation. Chat-
man and Barsade (1995) assess students' disposition to cooperate, following the random assignment to
either collectivist or individualist organizational cultures. They were interested in understanding how
personal cooperativeness (a personality characteristic) and an organization's emphasis on collectivistic
or individualistic values interact to inﬂuence members' cooperative behavior in a business simulation
game. A collectivist culture was induced by placing higher rewards on cooperation and teamwork. Thus,
the variation in incentives and organizational values is not independent in their study. They ﬁnd that
individualists in the collectivist culture display less cooperative behavior, which is consistent with their
personality. We ﬁnd similar eﬀects in regard to matching such that proselfs underperform in the prosocial
culture when exposed to a team contest incentive scheme. Chatman and Barsade (1995) also ﬁnd that
individuals with a high disposition to cooperate show relatively low levels of cooperation in individualist
organizational culture. We ﬁnd that prosocials in the prosocial culture with individual contests no longer
display a higher performance. Thus, unlike Chatman and Barsade we separate out diﬀerent dimensions of
organizational values, individual preferences as well as incentive schemes, and we investigate performance
in contests instead of cooperative behavior in social dilemmas.
Chen et al. (2007) run voluntary contribution game sessions in China and US and conclude that group
norms reinforce cooperation in the collectivist Chinese culture, but not in the individualist American one.
Drouvelis et al. (2010) ﬁnd that, compared to a neutral prime, prosocial priming increases the eﬀort in a
one-shot public goods game. Although their ﬁndings are supportive of ours, we do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence
in the average eﬀort between the no priming and prosocial priming condition - we only ﬁnd the diﬀerential
eﬀect of the prosocial prime on prosocial and proself individuals. However, like Chatman and Barsade
(1995), both Chen et al. (2007) and Drouvelis et al. (2010) are interested in cooperation and voluntary
contributions to a public good as opposed to performance in two alternative types of contests (Bull et
al., 1987; Orrison et al., 2004). Moreover neither Chen et al. (2007) nor Drouvelis et al. (2010) control
for the personal values of the subjects and it might be that their results are driven by the choices of the
most pro-social individuals.
There is also a related, small experimental literature studying mergers of two corporate cultures
springing from the seminal contribution by Weber and Camerer (2003). Instead of organizational values,
the focus of this line of research lies on the study of post-merger adaptation processes when the behavioral
norms for coordination may be conﬂicting in the two merging organizations (e.g., Camerer and Weber,
2008).
Kosfeld and von Siemens (2011) present a model where workers diﬀer in regard to their prosocial
preferences, worker preference type is private information, and ﬁrms compete for workers by oﬀering
wage contracts that can provide monetary incentives for individual eﬀort but not team eﬀort. Their
results show that there is no pooling in equilibrium, but that workers endogenously sort into ﬁrms whose
incentives are best aligned with their own prosocial preferences. In a similar way, in an experimental labor
market, Cabrales et al. (2009) ﬁnd that employers and employees with similar social preferences self-select
into a commonly preferred incentive platform. However, a more accurate explanation of observed levels
of teamwork is diﬃcult without careful control of worker preferences, the degree of incentives, and also,
as the present paper argues, explicit control of organizational values.
Laboratory experiments oﬀer a means of circumventing these challenges by providing tighter control.
Thus, it is not surprising that there has been a recent surge of experimental research studying the
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dynamics of teams. For instance, collaborative decision making within confronting teams has been shown
to induce more aggressive behavior closer to the predictions of rationality (Cooper and Kagel, 2005).
Using a contest structure similar to ours, Sutter and Strassmair (2009) study the eﬀects of intra-team
and inter-team communication on performance. They ﬁnd that intra-team communication leads to higher
performance. Yet, inter-team communication leads to the contrary. Even increasing the mere saliency of
team membership in such situations suﬃces for an increased aggressive stance to arise (Charness et al.,
2007 and Sutter, 2009).
To our knowledge, there is no other study examining the eﬀect of priming (a prosocial or proself
organizational culture) on performance in team contests and showing how this eﬀect varies with individual
preferences.
3 Theoretical considerations
In this section, we ﬁrst present the contest game played by subjects and study its game-theoretical
equilibria when contestants are self-interested. Then, we discuss the psychological values theory and the
received understanding of the impact of external prosocial and proself primes or cues on the accessibility
to individual values. We then propose a simple game theoretical model where we draw on the model
of in-group favoritism in Chen and Li (2009) to introduce and formalize the eﬀect of priming. We also
discuss the connections between this game theoretical model and values theory in psychology.
3.1 The contest game
We use the teams variant of the contest game ﬁrst presented in Orrison et al. (2004). For expositional
purposes we do not present the general model. Instead, we focus on the particular game actually played by
subjects in the subsequent experiment. The game has six participants i = 1, 2, ..., 6. The participants are
equally divided into two teams j = A,B. Without loss of generality, we let {1, 2, 3} = A and {4, 5, 6} = B.
The strategy for each player i is to choose a level of eﬀort ei ∈ [0, 100]. Let e=(e1,e2,...,e6) ∈ [0, 100]6
be the corresponding strategy proﬁle of all six participants. Exerting eﬀort is associated with a cost
c(ei) = e
2
i /(2c) with c = 10. Output is measured at the team level and is given by the sum of team
members' eﬀorts plus a random term, Xj =
∑
i∈j ei + εj , where each εj is independently and uniformly
distributed on the interval [−q, q] where q = 60. The team with the highest output wins 4800 ECUs
which are equally distributed so that every member of the winning team gets M = 1600 ECUs. Team
members of the losing team each receive m = 600 ECUs. The individual proﬁt function (for a risk-neutral
player) is given by:
pii(e) = Pr{Xj > X−j for i ∈ j|e}M + (1− Pr{Xj > X−j for i ∈ j|e})m− c(ei) (1)
where Pr{Xj > X−j for i ∈ j|e} is the probability that team j to which i belongs has a higher output
than the opposing team −j conditional on the eﬀort proﬁle e.
Consider a symmetric eﬀort proﬁle with eﬀort level eˆ and a deviation by player i to ei > eˆ. Given
the uniform distribution, this raises the winning probability by (ei − eˆ)/(2q) and increases the private
cost of eﬀort by (ei − eˆ)eˆ/c. There are two alternative outcomes. Either player i′s team wins in which
case i receives prize M or i′s team loses in which case the reward equals m. On the margin, a larger
eﬀort has a positive impact on the probability of being among the winners and a negative impact on the
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probability of being among the losers. These marginal eﬀects are of the same magnitudes but of opposite
signs. The pecuniary relative beneﬁt of increasing the probability of winning is thus of magnitudeM−m.
In the unique Nash equilibrium, players trade oﬀ the marginal beneﬁts and costs and the corresponding
symmetric equilibrium eﬀort equals e∗ = c2q (M −m) = 250/3 (see for theoretical considerations Orrison
et al., 2004 and Sutter and Strassmeier, 2009 ).
It is a priori not straightforward how other-regarding preferences aﬀect behavior in this game. In the
following section we use value theory in social psychology to understand prosocial or proself personal
values and how the accessibility of these values can be inﬂuenced by external primes and other cues,
notably those associated with organizational values as we argue in this paper. Combining insights from
value theory and in-group favoritism we then establish a behavioral-game-theoretic Nash equilibrium
prediction in the teams contest game using a simple social preference model where players are more
prosocial toward ingroup members than toward other people, outgroup members in particular. Finally,
we analyze how this prediction is aﬀected by priming and from this derive hypotheses.
3.2 Value theory and prosocial behavior
In psychology, values are considered to be desirable, stable, transsituational goals that vary in importance
and serve as guiding principles in people's lives (e.g. Schwartz, 1992). They capture the essential part of
an individual's personality that is relevant to motivation (Roccas et al., 2002). Values motivate behavior,
are decision-making standards, and guide attention and the interpretation of situational cues (e.g. De
Dreu and Nauta, 2009; Maio et al., 2009; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz et al., 2000).
Values diﬀer in their motivational goal: for instance the value of power motivates behaviors to domi-
nate others and seek recognition, wealth and authority. Schwartz's theory of basic human values proposes
ten such value types organized into two higher-order dimensions. Furthermore, the theory posits that
values show a systematic pattern of conﬂict and compatibilities. While valuing power is compatible and
indeed associated with valuing achievement (i.e. seeking personal success through demonstrating compe-
tence according to social standards), power conﬂicts with universalism (i.e. understanding, appreciation,
tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature) and benevolence (i.e. caring about
the welfare of people to whom one is close). Past research widely supports value theory. The structure
and proposed pattern of relations of the ten value types has been replicated across more than 80 cultures
(e.g. Schwartz, 2005). Associations of values with various outcomes including prosocial behaviors (e.g.
Schwartz, 2005, 2009) as well as the stability of values over time have been robustly demonstrated (Bardi
et al., 2009).
Of particular interest for the present research are four values that constitute the higher-order dimen-
sion of self-enhancement (power and achievement) vs. self-transcendence values (universalism and benev-
olence). Self-enhancement values reﬂect proself interest, a focus on extrinsic motivation, achievement,
outperformance and, dominance. Self-transcendence reﬂects prosocial motivation, a focus on intrinsic
motivation and other-regarding interest (Schwartz, 2009).
In-group bias is closely related to the prosocial value of benevolence. Schwartz (2012), when deﬁning
values in terms of the broad goals that they target, states that the deﬁning goal of benevolence is pre-
serving and enhancing the welfare of those with whom one is in frequent personal contact (the `in-group')
(Schwartz, 2012, p. 7, italics added). This suggests a close correspondence between in-group bias and
benevolence. Similarly the deﬁning goal of universalism is understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and
protection for the welfare of all people and for nature. (Schwartz, 2012, p.7, italics added). This suggests
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that universalism measures a positive concern for others, irrespective of their group membership. In our
correlation matrix in the appendix (Table 6), we ﬁnd a strong and signiﬁcant positive correlation between
the PVQ measures of universalism and benevolence.
The polar opposite to prosocial values are the proself (self-enhancement) values. The deﬁning goals
of proself values of achievement and power are stated by Schwartz (2012, p. 5) as follows: Both power
and achievement values focus on social esteem. However, achievement values (e.g., ambitious) emphasize
the active demonstration of successful performance in concrete interaction, whereas power values (e.g.,
authority, wealth) emphasize the attainment or preservation of a dominant position within the more
general social system. In line with these theoretical predictions, our data shows that achievement and
power are positively correlated and moreover that each of them is negatively correlated with universalism
and benevolence (see Table 6). These empirical patterns replicate previous ﬁndings in numerous studies
eliciting the PVQ measures (Schwartz 2005, 2009).
Intuitively, the inﬂuence of prosocial and proself values on team contest play is ambiguous. Prosocial
values could motivate individuals to do their very best for their team and work harder for own team
success. At the same time, these values may also motivate inter-team cooperation so as to give everyone
an equal chance of winning with the least eﬀort expended. Likewise, proself values could further encourage
team members to outperform the members of the opposing team, or they may discourage performance
due to the lack of within-team competition.
3.3 Formalization and predictions using behavioral game theory
To advance our understanding of how personal prosocial preferences and prosocial organizational values
may impact the behavior in team contests, let us cast the contest game in a simple other-regarding
model where the extent of regard for others depends on whether the other person is a member of the
same group as the agent or not. Group membership is a key feature in team contests where two groups
compete against one another.
Chen and Li (2009) pioneer such models and provide experimental evidence in favor of such prefer-
ences.3 In particular, Chen and Li (2009) estimate other-regarding preferences and in-group bias in a
large number of two-player interactions in a setting where the two parties' group-membership is exoge-
nously varied. Their economic decision making experiment provides evidence that many other-regarding
concerns, such as charity and envy, depend on whether the other party belongs to the same group or not.
Altruistic concerns for ingroup members, for instance, are more important than for outgroup members.
As argued in the previous section, personal values relate to personal goals, social identity, and in-group
bias (Schwartz, 2012), and personal values and preferences impact the way team and organizational goals
are internalized, for instance (Johnson et al. 2010).
It is fairly straightforward to apply a simpliﬁed version of the model in Chen and Li (2009) to the
teams contest game framework. Let (without loss of generality) player i belong to team A. A simple
model of group identity holds that the other-regarding payoﬀ of player i is a weighted sum of all parties'
payoﬀs; pik, k = 1, ..., 6
pˆii(e) = µpii(e) + (1− µ)[ω
∑
k∈A,k 6=i
pik(e) + (1− ω)
∑
k/∈A
pik(e)].
The ﬁrst term in the sum is player i's own payoﬀ which receives weight µ. Altruism decreases with µ and
3In social psychology, Tajfel and Turner (1979) provide seminal contributions to the literature.
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and pure self interest is captured by µ = 1 in which case the residual terms in the sum are zero. The
second term sums over monetary payoﬀs of the team mates of i. This term receives a weight (1 − µ)ω.
The last term sums over monetary payoﬀs of the members of the rival team and receives a weight of
(1 − µ)(1 − ω). In line with the ﬁndings of Chen and Li (2009), we assume that ω ≥ 1/2, i.e. altruistic
concerns toward in-groups are more important than concerns for out-groups. The special case of no
ingroup-bias corresponds to ω = 1/2. A competitive individual seeking to outperform others would have
µ > 1, implying a negative coeﬃcient on others, 1 − µ < 0. As another special case, notice that a
model of parochial altruism (Choi and Bowles, 2007) would hold that 0 < µ < 1 and ω > 1 and thus
that 0 > 1 − ω so that i is altruistic toward ingroups and spiteful toward outgroups. Competitiveness
and parochial altruism may be less transsituational than other values and more triggered by contest-like
settings (Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
3.3.1 Values, goals, and other-regarding payoﬀs
In-group-bias and benevolence will be theoretically captured by high ω in our model. Universalism, for its
part, is theoretically captured by low µ, and thus by large positive concern, 1−µ, for all other participants
in the contest. Proself values of power and achievement are the polar opposite of prosocial values and
thus proself values are represented by high µ (close to one or above one) and low ω in our model.
Our behavioral measures of prosocial preferences (dictator giving and trust game backtransfer) are
positively correlated with benevolence (in-group bias) and universalism (positive concerns for general
others) and negatively correlated with the proself values of power and achievement (Table 6 in the
appendix). Thus the participants with high dictator giving, for instance, are expected to behave as
agents with low µ:s and with high ω:s in the group contest (indeed a simple formalization of the dictator
and trust games would reveal that the lower is µ the more an agent would give in the dictator game
and transfer back in the trust game). In addition, the participants with low dictator giving are expected
to behave as agents with large high µ:s and with low ω:s in the group contest. Before pinning down
the theoretical predictions in the teams contest game with such other-regarding concerns, let us study
the impact of the organizational values on these personal concerns for others, i.e. the eﬀect of the value
primes on personal values.
3.3.2 The eﬀect of priming on the other-regarding parameters
Values theory suggests that priming has an impact on the accessibility to the corresponding personal
value (see p. 3 in the introduction), particularly if the value is a predominant one.4 In other words,
experimentally priming a speciﬁc value should especially impact those scoring high on the corresponding
value. In our model, the weight for in-group bias, ω, and the weight on own payoﬀ, µ, are considered to
be continuously diﬀerentiable functions of organizational values which we proxy with the prosocial prime
and the proself prime.
Prosocial priming, for instance, should impact positively the ω-weights of those with a high ω, that
is dω > 0 iﬀ ω ≥ ω where ω is some threshold type. Secondly, given that universal prosocial motivation
4The eﬀect of priming is commonly explained in reference to network theories of memory. The prime activates concepts
related to the prime as well as action repertoires, which lead to the observable response (Bargh, 2006; Custers and Aarts,
2010). The stronger the networks links between the concepts and action repertoires, the stronger the eﬀect of the prime.
Thus priming has a particularly strong inﬂuence on activities aligned with one's needs, motivation, and goals. Thus prosocial
priming should impact particularly those prosocially motivated. Karremans et al. (2006), for instance, demonstrate that
subliminal priming of a drink brand name positively aﬀected participants who were thirsty.
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can be considered as corresponding to values of µ below one and closer to 1/2, prosocial priming should
have a negative impact on the µ-weights of those with particularly low µ, i.e. dµ < 0 iﬀ µ < µ where µ
is some threshold type.
Proself priming should impact positively the µ-weights of those with high µ, that is dµ > 0 iﬀ µ ≥ µ
where µ is some threshold type and negatively the ω values of those with low ω.
3.3.3 The eﬀect of the personal preferences and organizational values on eﬀort
Subsection 3.1 derived the symmetric equilibrium of the teams contest game when µ = 1. Let us now
study the equilibrium in the general case. In addition to the pecuniary eﬀects discussed earlier for the
case when µ = 1, there are non-pecuniary beneﬁts that depend on the other-regarding preference weights.
In the teams contest, for instance, the gross beneﬁt to oneself also accrues to one's two team mates and
thus positive eﬀects are multiplied by the factor µ + 2(1 − µ)ω. Yet, there is an opposite eﬀect on the
three members of the opposing team associated with a coeﬃcient −3(1− µ)(1− ω).
In a symmetric equilibrium, the marginal beneﬁt of exerting eﬀort must equal the marginal cost. So
in a teams contest,
µe∗
c
=
(M −m)(µ+ (1− µ)(2ω − 3(1− ω))
2q
,
or, equivalently,
e∗ =
c(M −m)
2q
· (1 + (1− µ)(5ω − 3)
µ
). (2)
Since the term (1 − µ)(5ω − 3) is positive when ω > 3/5 and µ < 1, it is the altruists with an in-
group bias who provide more eﬀort than the self-interested with no other-regarding motives. Notice
also that ∂e
∗
∂µ = − c(M−m)2q 5ω−3µ2 , ∂e
∗
∂ω =
c(M−m)
2q
5(1−µ)
µ , and
∂e∗
∂ω∂µ = − c(M−m)2q 5µ2 . In other words, eﬀort
is increasing in altruism (recall that µ falls when altruism gets stronger) when in-group favoritism is
strong, i.e. if ω > 3/5; and the stronger the in-group bias, the stronger the positive association of
eﬀort and altruism. Second, altruists' eﬀort increases in in-group favoritism; the stronger altruism is,
the stronger the association between in-group favoritism and eﬀort. Thus, the eﬀects of altruism and
in-group favortism reinforce one another.
The eﬀects of proself motivation on eﬀort tend to be negative and smaller in absolute terms than on
the prosocial side: changes in ω have little impact on eﬀort if µ is close to one, and changes in µ have little
impact on eﬀort if ω is close to 3/5. Intuitively, self-interest tends to erode any motivation to sacriﬁce
for one's team. Moreover, the eﬀects may have an ambiguous sign. Stonger self-interest, for instance,
slightly promotes the eﬀort of those without much in-group bias, ω = 3/5 − ε, but erodes the eﬀort of
those with a little more in-group bias, ω = 3/5 + ε, for any small but positive ε. Similarly, stronger
in-group bias slightly promotes the eﬀort of those with a little altruism µ = 1− ε but erodes the eﬀort of
the slightly competitive ones, µ = 1 + ε.
Let us now consider the impact of priming on eﬀort in our team contest model.5 The eﬀect of prosocial
priming on equilibrium eﬀort is proportional to
(1− µ)5
µ
dω − (5ω − 3)
µ2
dµ. (3)
5To keep the model simple and tractable, we have considered a symmetric equilibrium of a model with homogenous
agents. This is admittedly a shortcoming and, ideally, one would consider the eﬀects in an equilibrium model where all
types are present at the same time.
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Above we argued that the impact of the prosocial priming is positive, i.e. dω > 0, iﬀ ω ≥ ω and dµ < 0
iﬀ µ < µ. Indeed, both eﬀects in (3) are positive for prosocials if µ < 1 and if ω ≥ 3/5. These latter
two are likely to simultaneously hold since µ and ω are negatively correlated (for supportive evidence on
the negative correlation, see Table 6 in the appendix; for theoretical arguments, see Section 3.2. and this
section after equation (2)).
Let us then formalize the eﬀect of proself priming on performance in the teams contest. This is
negative if
(1− µ)5
µ
dω − (5ω − 3)
µ2
dµ < 0. (4)
As argued above, dµ > 0 iﬀ µ ≥ µ where µ is some threshold type closer to one. Moreover proself values
are negatively associated with ω and thus if proself priming has an impact on ω, this impact will be
negative, dω < 0 iﬀ ω ≤ ω where ω is some threshold type below ω.
The ﬁrst eﬀect in (4) should be approximately zero and of an ambiguous sign since, due to individ-
ual heterogeneity among the proselfs, µ varies on both sides of one (self-interest and competitiveness).
Moreover, the sign of the second eﬀect is not expected to be particularly strong either. This is due to the
fact that the negative correlation of µ and ω implies that ω conditional on µ ≥ µ takes values possibly
on both sides of 3/5 and closer to 1/2, so that the eﬀect is again ambiguous and small.
We summarize our theoretical results in the following paragraph.
Proposition: Prosocial priming is expected to have a positive eﬀect on performance in the teams
contest due to its magnifying impact on prosocial individuals' concern for others, especially for the team
mates. The impact of the proself prime on performance, on the other hand, should be insigniﬁcant and
of ambiguous sign.
4 Experimental design and procedures
In order to causally study person-organization ﬁt in a controlled environment, we resort to an experimental
design with three core building blocks. The ﬁrst key element is an exogenous manipulation of values, i.e.
priming, of which subjects are unaware. The priming condition serves as a proxy for the organizational
values. This part is operationalized by using word-puzzles with connotative words - a standard procedure
in social psychology (Bargh et al., 2000) and further described below. The second pillar is the team
contest game, which immediately follows the manipulation of the organizational values and replicates the
competing teams design of Orrison et al. (2004) and Sutter and Strassmair (2009). The core feature
of this game is that a higher performance is monetarily more costly but leads to a greater likelihood of
winning a monetary prize (see Section 3.1). The third pillar is an elicitation procedure for measuring
personal preferences and values. To achieve this we utilize two complementary methods: ﬁrst, a battery of
choices in simple incentivized social interactions frequently used by economists; second, the PVQ survey
tool, which is typically used by social psychologists (Schwartz et al., 2001). In what follows we discuss
the implementation of these three pillars in detail.
4.1 The priming procedure
Immediately before the contest game, a word scramble is used to prime subjects into two alternative or-
ganizational culture conditions: a prosocial, organizational culture (WE) where universalism and benev-
olence values are the main dimensions and a competitive, proself organizational culture (ME), where
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power and achievement values are the central dimensions. Finally, as a control, we have a third organi-
zational culture condition, labeled as Neutral (N), where the words in the scramble tasks had no special
connotation.
We use value-laden word-scrambles, which is a well-established, robust and widely used priming
method (Bargh, 2006; Bargh and Chartrand, 2000; Maio et al., 2009).6 The word-scramble priming
has the advantage of not requiring specialist technological equipment. It is a so-called supraliminal
priming technique, where subjects are aware of the task itself, but are not aware that the pattern of
words primes values. Speciﬁcally, the priming procedure requires subjects to construct a meaningful and
grammatically correct sentence using four of the ﬁve words with which they are presented. We follow
the procedures described in Bargh and Chartrand (2000) and also in Bargh et al., (2001). The subjects
have to solve 30 items, i.e. scrambled sentences, 15 of which in the WE and ME conditions are primed
according to the WE or ME prime, respectively. We also have a neutral condition without any primed
value (denoted N). The other 15 items in each condition represent neutral sentences. Examples are 'be
want I helpful to would' (I want to be helpful; WE-item), 'target goals my for I' (I target my goals;
ME-item), and 'am I today here would' (I am here today; N-item). Prime-words were taken from the
Schwartz Value Survey (Schwartz, 1992), which is a theory-based and well-validated instrument for mea-
suring cultural and personal values and which lists a series of synonymous or specifying words for each
value. For example, the prime words for WE were as follows: reliable, responsible, helpfulness, honest,
loyal, forgiving, sincere, tolerant, just, wisdom, equality, peace, preserving nature, broad-minded, and
environmentally-conscious. Prime words were taken from the German version of the Schwartz Value
Survey to circumvent translation problems.
Participants were presented with the scrambled sentences on a sheet of paper and were given an
example of how to solve this 'word-puzzle' task. Prime-items and neutral items were alternated, in
order to limit the likelihood that subjects would become aware of the prime content. In the ex post
questionnaire, subjects were asked a series of 'funneled' questions after the experiment (see Bargh et
al., 2001). More speciﬁcally, subjects were asked the following: what do you think the experiment tried
to capture. Do you think your behavior in one task was inﬂuenced by another experimental task, and
if so what were those inﬂuences? Did you noticed something unusual in the word puzzle? Did you
noticed some kind of pattern or common topic in the word puzzle items and, if so, what kind of pattern
or common topic you noticed? Sixty-two respondents of the total 460 were excluded from the analysis
as they recognized a common theme among the scrambled sentences (e.g. social justice, achievement,
success, power). These respondents are uniformly distributed over the sessions and treatments and the
results are robust to the inclusion of these respondents.
4.2 The contest game
Immediately following the priming, subjects switched to the contest game. The subjects were randomly
matched into groups of six and further to teams of three to make eﬀort choices in the contest. There
were ﬁve groups, thus 10 teams and 30 subjects in each session. The contest was repeated 10 times,
keeping the matching ﬁxed. After each round, the subject learned whether she had won the prize and
was reminded of her eﬀort in that round. Once all 10 rounds of the experiment had been completed, we
handed out a questionnaire which, indirectly, inquired whether participants grasped the purpose of the
6For diﬀerent ways to prime values see e.g., Bargh and Chartrand, (2000), Oyserman (2011) and Oyserman and Lee
(2008).
13
experiment and the purpose of the word puzzle in particular (see the 'funneled' questions described in the
previous paragraph 4.1). This is the standard procedure in priming experiments (Bargh and Chartrand,
2000).
4.3 Elicitation of personal preferences and values
Once the questionnaire regarding the understanding of the priming condition had been completed (as
described in Section 4.1), we started a new questionnaire with 19 questions on prosocial and proself
personal values, a subset of the 40-question PVQ questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2001, explained in the
appendix). Thereafter we elicited the preferences of the subjects using behavioral methods. First, risk
preferences were evaluated through a battery of nine questions using the standard Holt and Laury (2002)
risk-aversion elicitation method. Second, we elicited subjects' choices in three social interactions where
sharing is an integral dimension: a Dictator game, an Ultimatum game and a Trust game. We elicited
behavior in both roles for the two latter games (the instructions are available upon request). This amounts
to 14 decisions. The subjects were told that one of the choices would be drawn as payoﬀ-relevant and
matched to a randomly drawn opponent's choice and paid-out accordingly at the end of the lab-part of
the experiment.
A week and a half before the actual lab experiment, the subjects in a large subset of the experimental
sessions made choices in the same 14 incentivized tasks (test-retest design). These choices were also
incentivized. This pre-elicitation was conducted as a robustness check. We wanted to ensure that the
elicitation of personal preferences through simple interactive tasks would not be inﬂuenced by the subjects'
experiences during the contest phase of the experiment. In Section 5, we show that our results are robust
to using the pre-elicited values. The values survey was only administered after the performance task since
in a pilot study, we learned that it contaminates the word puzzle manipulation if elicited ex ante.
4.4 Laboratory procedures
Subjects were recruited using ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004) and the performance task in the experi-
ment was programmed and conducted using z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007).
In the laboratory, we were careful to directly control many other possible factors that might bias
behavior or add noise. The temperature in the lab was set to 22*C and we always kept the curtains
closed in an attempt to exclude or minimize the inﬂuence of temperature or weather. The sessions were
always at 1PM to provide maximum control of hour-of-day selection across prime comparisons. Levitt
and List (2011) highlight the importance of such considerations. One neutral priming session had to be
run at a diﬀerent point in time since all the sessions had to be run within a week. We have control over
experimenter eﬀects since there was always one given staﬀ member communicating with the subjects in
exactly half of each of the priming conditions (implying a balanced sample when it comes to experimenter
eﬀects). Psychology students were excluded from the subject sampling frame, since they were likely to be
familiar with priming studies. Also those with any previous participation in priming experiments were
excluded.
We checked the identity of the subjects and randomly allocated them to a visually isolated cubicle
in the laboratory. They received a hard-copy of the instructions, written in German, and were told that
everyone would get an identical copy. Once participants had read through the instructions, they received
the word-puzzles with connotations of words depending on the experimental treatment (WE, ME, N).
This served two purposes: a manipulation of organizational culture and a language comprehension test.
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In total, three subjects of those invited in 2009 were substituted by reserve subjects, because of lacking
language skills. Word puzzles were always correctly ﬁlled out in the sessions in July 2011. Once two
thirds of the subjects had completed the puzzle, the experimental contest game was started and subjects
proceeded at an individual pace to complete the ﬁrst round of the game. Each subject was instructed to
ﬁrst complete the puzzle before typing in their eﬀort choice in the contest game.
Once all decisions had been completed, public draws of payoﬀ-relevant tasks were made and subjects
were paid individually according to their pre-elicitation and laboratory choices. This pay-out stage lasted
20 to 25 minutes. The actual lab-experiment lasted on average 1 hour and 10 minutes.
5 Experimental Analysis
The data was collected over the period 2009-2011 at the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena,
Germany. We ran the ﬁrst sessions in 2009 and the initial results encouraged us to collect more data
to increase the statistical power needed for the analysis of interaction eﬀects. We also changed the
timing of the elicitation of the behavioral measure to ensure and verify a truly exogenous variation in
that dimension as well. That is, we elicited the dictator giving and other interaction choices measuring
individual prosociality (trust game, ultimatum game) both one and a half weeks before the lab experiment
(over the internet) and then again after the contest game. The choices were incentivized and paid out at
the end of the laboratory experiment. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in dictator giving across these
two timing designs, and our results are robust to the alternative timing.
Appendix A4 provides a detailed description of the experimental time line. Before we embark on the
analysis, we provide some descriptive statistics of the behavioral measures that we use in the ensuing
OLS regressions that strive to explain individual eﬀort choices. In Table 1, summary statistics and a
short description of the variables used in the analysis are presented.
As the measures in Table 1 try to elicit closely related underlying preferences, it is also worth noting
that they correlate in an expected manner. In the appendix we provide pairwise correlations along with a
discussion. In short Table 6 in the appendix shows that both universalism and benevolence are typically
signiﬁcantly positively correlated with our behavioral measures of prosociality - the dictator giving and
the trustee backtransfer. Moreover, power and achievement are signiﬁcantly negatively correlated with
these behavioral measures. This suggests that the interpersonal variation in dictator giving and trustee
backtransfers constitutes valid behavioral correlates of the prosocial-proself (self-transcendence vs. self-
enhancement) personal value dimensions. We also show that there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in the elicited measures over the diﬀerent treatments (with the exception of Universalism) which indicates
that randomization worked and that the prime did not spill over to these measures. Most importantly,
the Dictator variable which is the main focus of our subsequent analysis does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
between treatments. We use OLS regressions to analyze the data and cluster the standard errors over the
groups of subjects that interacted. In what follows we start by analyzing behavior in a team contest and
then move on to robustness checks using alternative measures of prosocialty (section 5.2) and varying
incentive design (section 5.3).
5.1 Person-Organization Fit in Team Contest
A total of 231 subjects took part in the team contest sessions (#N = 88, #WE = 70 and #ME = 73).
Table 2 presents the results of a set of diﬀerent OLS regressions where individual eﬀort is the dependent
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variable. In these speciﬁcations we systematically add independent variables. Model 4 tests the hypoth-
esized interaction eﬀects of person-organisation ﬁt under team tournament incentives by interacting the
Dictator variable with the priming condition (WE and ME primes with the Neutral prime as baseline)
- with various control variables added in Model 5 and 6. We note that the coeﬃcient on the interaction
term WE ×Dictator is positive and highly signiﬁcant in all three models (4 to 6), indicating that more
prosocial individuals tend to exert more eﬀort when primed with a prosocial prime (independent of the
speciﬁc set of control variables). On the other hand, the corresponding coeﬃcient for the proself prime is
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. These eﬀects are in line with the predictions of our group-identity
model with ingroup-bias in altruism, see Section 3.3. We also estimated the model using a pre-elicited
measure of giving in the Dictator game. As can be seen in Table 11 in the appendix, this does not aﬀect
the main results.
We also note that the coeﬃcient on the mere eﬀect of prosocial priming (WE) becomes negative and
signiﬁcant when the interaction WE ×Dictator is included. This is intuitive as it indicates that those
with proself values who give nothing to the opponent in the dictator game react to prosocial priming by
providing less eﬀort than when neutrally primed - an indication of a negative eﬀect of mismatch of the
person and the organization. Yet, this negative eﬀect falls outside the scope of our model in Section 3.3.
Models 3 and 6 are robustness checks using the self-reported PVQ-value measures. As a robustness
check we also run regressions, adding them one by one, but this does not change the results (see Appendix
A.2). We excluded the behavioral measures from the Trust game and the Ultimatum game in the
main speciﬁcations presented in this section since they did not add any explanatory power in the OLS
regressions when already controlling for dictator giving. In section 5.2 we provide an analysis using both
the ultimatum game acceptance threshold and the trustee back-transfer in turn as an alternative measure
of prosociality instead of dictator giving. The regression results provide equally strong support for our
conclusions.
Interestingly, we note that the Dictator variable is signiﬁcant in Model 2, i.e. when no interaction
term is added. The eﬀect is positive indicating that overall under team tournament incentives, the more
pro-social individuals exert higher eﬀort as predicted by the model in Section 3.3. However, this eﬀect
disappears in subsequent models.
We further note that overall there seems to be no signiﬁcant eﬀect of gender. This is a ﬁnding in line
with the recent study of Healy and Patt (2011), which suggests a smaller gender gap in team contests. In
addition, we do not ﬁnd any risk-preference eﬀects which may be puzzling given the results, for instance, of
Shreremeta (2011). Yet, in team contests, the team members rely on each other and in a well-functioning
team, each member trusts that others also contribute. From this perspective, our ﬁndings are in line with
those of Eckel and Wilson (2004) who ﬁnd no links between decisions to trust and decisions to take risks.
To get a better understanding of how the Dictator variable interacts with the priming conditions we
have plotted the marginal eﬀect of the prime dummy on each level of dictator giving, along with the
corresponding 95% conﬁdence interval. Figure 1 illustrates the strong match and mismatch eﬀects of
prosocial priming on subjects with diﬀerent degrees of individual prosocial prefererences as captured by
the dictator variable. Those who are most prosocial are estimated to exert a 40 point higher eﬀort in
WE than in N, while the most proself individuals (who give nothing in the dictator game) provide 20
points less eﬀort. The modal person, who donates half of the windfall earnings to a random stranger in
the dictator game, is estimated to provide about 10 points more eﬀort in WE. Recall that the monetary
opportunity cost on the upside is higher given the convex monetary cost of eﬀort.
Non-parametric tests also support our ﬁndings. We ﬁrst divide the group of participants into a
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Table 2: OLS Regressions Team Tournament
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WE -2.205 -2.517 -0.499 -21.67*** -16.77** -17.79**
[3.669] [3.604] [3.365] [7.312] [7.696] [7.292]
ME -2.212 -2.229 -2.045 -4.106 -4.159 -4.440
[3.668] [3.587] [3.386] [6.637] [6.595] [6.410]
Dictator 16.66** 11.61 -3.306 -2.327 -5.926
[7.768] [7.821] [10.19] [9.886] [9.874]
WE×Dictator 62.13*** 51.11*** 53.95***
[15.97] [17.20] [16.70]
ME×Dictator 6.396 5.904 7.494
[15.93] [16.05] [15.98]
Benevolence 2.608 3.323*
[1.826] [1.726]
Universalism -1.240 -1.357
[2.052] [1.898]
Achievement -0.963 -1.368
[1.913] [1.940]
Power -0.408 -0.144
[1.624] [1.682]
Period -0.604** -0.604** -0.604**
[0.273] [0.273] [0.273]
Female -4.153 -1.840 -2.153
[3.289] [3.164] [3.315]
Risk -0.941 -0.531 -0.571
[0.875] [0.887] [0.901]
Constant 64.61*** 59.69*** 71.21*** 65.59*** 73.20*** 70.77***
[2.075] [3.268] [13.85] [4.035] [5.946] [12.67]
Observations 2,310 2,310 2,280 2,310 2,280 2,280
Note: Eﬀort is the dependent variable. N prime is the baseline. Period is a linear time trend and Female is a dummy indicating
the gender of the subject. Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered at the group level). p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1: Interaction effects between Dictator giving and the priming condition with
95% confidence interval.
prosocial half and a proself half at the median of dictator giving. Then we study the eﬀect of priming
on individual eﬀort in the team contest. The eﬀect of the WE prime on the eﬀort of the prosocials is
positive (p-values 0.077 and 0.028 for ﬁrst period eﬀort and average eﬀort, respectively) but there is no
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the ME-prime on the eﬀort in this group (p-values 0.462 and 0.434 for ﬁrst period
eﬀort and average eﬀort, respectively). The eﬀect of the WE prime on the eﬀort of the proselfs is negative
(p-values 0.001 and 0.02 for ﬁrst period and average eﬀort, respectively) and there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect
of the ME prime among the proselfs (p-values 0.256 and 0.727 for the ﬁrst period eﬀort, respectively).
The interaction eﬀect indicates that the eﬀect of prosocial priming is highly heterogeneous over the
population and the average eﬀect is ambiguous and will depend on the composition of the group with
regard to prosocial individuals. This explains why we do not ﬁnd any average treatment eﬀects as shown
in models 1-3 in Table 2. To complement this result Table 3 gives the per subject average exerted eﬀort by
treatment. A non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-test on the average eﬀort choice in each group conﬁrms
that there is no diﬀerence between treatments. (Since subjects were matched in ﬁxed groups during the
entire contest, these averages are statistically independent.)
Table 3: Summary statistics
N WE ME Total
Mean eﬀort 64.61 62.406 62.399 63.243
s.d. 20.538 21.902 20.882 21.002
In sum, the regressions show a statistically highly signiﬁcant interaction eﬀect between personal pref-
erences (using the dictator game giving as a behavioral measure for prosocial personal values) and proso-
cially primed organizational values. The interaction graph in Figure 1 further illustrates that not only is
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there a statistically signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of a prosocial organizational values on the performance of
the most prosocial types but that further, the most proself orientated individuals under-perform under
the same organizational value prime. The fact that we get a lower eﬀort on average is due to the average
dictator giving being fairly low, about 0.3, and an important fraction giving nothing, in our sample. We
do not observe the corresponding result for the proself priming condition, which is once more in line with
the model in Section 3.3.
A question that arises is whether the positive link between prosocial preferences and the prosocial
prime is robust. In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we perform two important robustness tests. The ﬁrst is with re-
spect to using diﬀerent measures of prosocial preferences, and the second is with respect to the underlying
incentive structure.
5.2 Robustness Check I: Alternative measures of prosocial preferences
In this section, we consider alternative measures of prosocial preferences. Instead of dictator giving, we
interact the priming variables with ultimatum-game proposals (UltimatOf) and acceptance thresholds
(UltimatRe), trust-game transfers (Trustor) and backtransfers (Trustee)7. It should be noted that these
alternative measures are not expected to be perfect substitutes for dictator giving as a measure of proso-
cialness. For example, ultimatum-game acceptance thresholds may be driven by reciprocal and spiteful
preferences. Yet higher values of these choice variables constitute more substantial deviations from the
predictions of self-interested rationality and Table 6 in the Appendix show that these alternative measures
are in fact all positively correlated with dictator game giving.
Table 4 summarizes the ﬁndings from OLS regressions with individual eﬀort as dependent variable,
using the alternative behavioral measures. The ﬁrst column in the table replicates the results of Model
4 of Table 2 for a comparison. The full regression results of the corresponding models are available in
Table 9 in the appendix. Each column in Table 4 represents a regression where we have interacted the
behavioral measure at hand with the treatment prime. The Main variable represents the coeﬃcient of
the main eﬀect and the two Interact-variables represent the interaction coeﬃcients.
Table 4: Summary table: Interaction effects of alternative measures of prosociality
with primed organisational culture (WE, ME)
Dictator UltimatRe Trustee UltimatOf Trustor
Main -3.306 -10.41 15.90 -7.200 5.897
Interact×WE 62.13*** 62.90** 51.24** 65.81 10.01
Interact×ME 6.396 5.430 -29.05* 34.19 -0.876
All coeﬃcients on the interaction with the WE prime show the expected sign and the ﬁrst three
are similar in magnitude to the Dictator variable, but only UltimatumRe and Trustee interactions are
signiﬁcant. We also see that the Trustee interacts negatively with the self-interest (ME) prime, albeit
only at the 10% level, indicating a negative eﬀect of misalignment of prosocial preferences and the proself
prime. This is once more in line with the person-organization misﬁt conjecture. However, since this eﬀect
7See Camerer, 2003, pp. 43-117, for a detailed description of these games)
20
is not present when other measures are used as regressors, we refrain from extensively interpreting this
result.
One plausible explanation for the non-signiﬁcant result of UltimatOf may be that behavior in the ﬁrst-
mover Ultimatum proposer position can be driven by both prosocial preferences and selﬁsh preferences
with a heterogenous fear of being rejected by (inequity averse or reciprocity concerned) responders, hence
rendering the measure more noisy. On the contrary, a higher acceptance threshold of the responder
(UltimatRe) is less likely driven by beliefs (selﬁsh preferences) and hence more clearly driven by other-
regarding concerns, thus giving a more precise measure of prosocial preferences in general than UltimatOf.
On similar grounds, the second-moving Trustee's behavior in the trust game (i.e. the amount returned
to the Trustor) is more clearly driven by prosocial preferences than a ﬁrst-moving Trustor's behavior.
Table 6 in the appendix again provides support for these views: Trustee and Dictator are generally
signiﬁcantly correlated with Achievement, Power, Benevolence, and Universalism and with expected signs;
yet Trustor, UltimatOf are generally not signiﬁcantly correlated with Achievement, Power, Benevolence,
and Universalism, but when they are, the signs are as expected.8 Overall, we conclude that our results
of a positive interaction between individual pro-sociality and the WE prime are robust, particularly for
pure behavioral measures of pro-sociality.
We also ran analogous regressions using the PVQ-measures of prosociality and their interaction with
the prime but the results are statistically insigniﬁcant. This may be due to the fact that we had to elicit
the PVQ-measures ex post to prevent the subjects from gaining insight into the role of the word-puzzle
in the experiment. See Appendix A4.
5.3 Robustness Check II: Alternative Incentive Structure
In this section we check if the eﬀect of priming in team contests carries over to individualistic incentive
structures, where team motivation and in-group bias are absent. In particular, we conduct identical
experiments as described above except that we now let individuals rather than teams compete. In total,
167 subjects participated (#N = 76, #WE = 50 and #ME = 41) in this experiment that took place
in July 2011. The contest is constructed in the following manner. Individual subjects now compete for
three prizes in a group of six contestants. Players are ranked according to their individual output and
the top three players each win a prize of 1600 ECUs. Thus, the private value of winning the contest
coincides in this contest and the team contest. There is also the same number of winning players and the
same number of losing players in this contest and the team contest.
Player i's output is given by ei + εi. We keep the strategy set, the cost function, the size of the prize
and the distribution of ε the same as in the team contest game. This set-up is very similar to the team
contest except for the team formations. Indeed, Orrison et al. (2004) showed that under risk-neutrality
and self-interest the theoretical equilibrium eﬀort level is invariant to the modiﬁcations and thus coincides
in the two contest types.
We extend the results of Orrison et al. to allow for other-regarding concerns applying the model of
Section 3.3. There are no salient groups in the competing individuals contest and the altruism weight
for other players is (1 − µ)w for all players. Given monetary compensation pik for k= 1, ...6, the other-
8Even UltimatRe is generally not signiﬁcantly correlated with Achievement, Power, Benevolence, and Universalism, but
when it is, the signs are as expected. The weaker correlations may be due to the fact that somewhat diﬀerent other-
regarding motivations, such as negative reciprocity and spite drive the rejection behavior while positive reciprocity and
altruism underlie Trustee backtransfers and Dictator giving.
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regarding payoﬀ function of player i reads
pˆii(e) = µpii(e) + (1− µ)w
∑
j 6=i
pij(e).
We assume that w = 1/2 so that in-groups in team contests are assumed to have a higher altruistic weight
than general others in the individual contest, ω ≥ w (see Section 3.3. above). The general others have a
higher altruistic weight than out-groups, w ≥ 1 − ω. These assumptions are in line with the model and
ﬁndings of Chen and Li (2009).
In a symmetric equilibrium of the competing individual contest, the expression for equilibrium eﬀort
satisﬁes
e∗ =
c(M −m)
2q
(1− 5(1− µ)
2µ
) (5)
and thus, an altruistic i is less willing and a competitive i is more willing to put in more eﬀort in the
individual contest than a self-interested i: this is exactly as suggested by Bandiera et al. (2005) and
Matsumura and Shin (2006) and in line with regression Models 2 and 3 in Table 5 where the coeﬃcient
of the Dictator variable is signiﬁcantly negative.
The self-interested i exerts exactly the same eﬀort in the individual contest and the competing teams
contest as shown by Orrison et al. (2004). In essence this means that we have a tight control over the
incentive structure and hence, diﬀerences between the two contests cannot be attributed to diﬀerences
in equilibrium behavior by self-interested, risk-neutral, and rational players (in the sense of a Nash
equilibrium).
Taking the derivative w.r.t. µ reveals that the eﬀect of proself-priming (ME) on equilibrium eﬀort is
proportional to 52µ2 dµ. According to Section 3, the eﬀect should apply to those scoring high on proself
values, i.e. those with a high µ. This eﬀect is positive but decreasing in µ since a high µ also implies a
stronger emphasis on the private cost over any eﬀects on the beneﬁt side. This implies that one should
perhaps expect weaker eﬀects of proself priming than on the prosocial side.
The eﬀect of prosocial priming (WE), capitalizing through ω, is absent in the competing individuals
model where in-group eﬀects are absent. The potential eﬀect of prosocial priming through µ on prosocial
individuals, dµ < 0 iﬀ µ < µ (see Section 3), would have a negative impact on eﬀort. Thus, we would
expect a weak negative or no interaction eﬀect between the Dictator variable and WE prime.
To get a better idea of the relative strengths of the priming eﬀects, assume that a representative
prosocial individual (high universalism & benevolence) has µ = 1/2 (consistent with 50-50 splits in
the dictator game) and ω = 1 and a representative proself individual has µ = 1 (consistent with giving
nothing in the dictator game) and ω = 1/2. Moreover, assume that the eﬀect of priming on the individual's
predominant value weights are always of the same magnitude, i.e. |dω|=|dµ|. By substituting these values
into the formal expressions, we learn that the positive eﬀect of prosocial priming on the eﬀort of prosocial
individuals in the teams contests is more than ﬁve times the eﬀect of proself priming on the eﬀort of
proself individuals in the individual contests. Hence, the treatment eﬀect is considerably smaller in the
individual contest. In line with these diﬀerences in relative impact, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect in the
teams contest but no signiﬁcant eﬀect in the individual contests. One should also expect a negative eﬀect
of prosocial priming on the eﬀort of prosocials in the individual contest. This eﬀect should be weaker
than the eﬀect in the teams contest but still about ¾ of the latter eﬀect under the current parameter
conﬁguration. But with some parochial altruism, ω = 1.2, this ratio would already fall to about ½ .
In Table 5, we do not ﬁnd an eﬀect of WE priming or of ME priming. The lack of an interaction
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between WE prime and Dictator giving with individualistic incentives and the presence of the posi-
tive interaction eﬀect with team incentives highlights the importance of the triple ﬁt between personal
preferences, organizational culture and the underlying incentive structure.
Table 5: OLS Regressions Individual Contests
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WE -4.023 -4.120 -1.314 -2.464 -0.328 -1.528
[3.593] [3.218] [3.534] [4.186] [4.853] [5.458]
ME -3.254 -2.643 1.300 -6.319 1.635 1.235
[4.843] [4.648] [4.572] [7.303] [4.717] [5.222]
Dictator -11.15** -15.66** -12.62 -14.49 -15.98
[5.522] [6.733] [9.301] [12.78] [14.19]
WE×Dictator -6.041 -3.678 0.722
[11.75] [15.77] [17.80]
ME×Dictator 12.34 -1.708 0.216
[14.44] [14.73] [15.44]
Benevolence -0.262 -0.275
[2.639] [2.730]
Universalism 1.511 1.526
[1.793] [1.872]
Achievement 1.781 1.790
[1.587] [1.703]
Power 0.767 0.770
[1.813] [1.840]
Period 0.463* 0.463* 0.463*
[0.239] [0.239] [0.239]
Female 1.803 1.497 1.793
[2.947] [3.100] [3.063]
Risk 1.039 0.761 1.047
[0.876] [0.874] [0.937]
Constant 79.72*** 82.40*** 55.95*** 82.87*** 72.26*** 55.96***
[2.110] [2.134] [12.22] [2.676] [6.656] [12.51]
Observations 1,670 1,610 1,360 1,610 1,360 1,360
Note: Individual eﬀort is the dependent variable. N prime is the baseline. Period is a linear time trend and Female is a dummy
indicating the gender of the subject. Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered at the group level). p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6 Discussion
The paper combines two strands of research, one on organization-person ﬁt (e.g., Hoﬀmann and Woehr,
2006; Schneider, 1987) and the other on the optimal design of incentives in the economics (Prendergast,
1999) and management literatures (Gerhardt et al., 2009). Person-organization ﬁt theory has so far
mostly considered the match of people's value preferences to the organizational culture without paying
attention to the incentives used in the organizations. Similarly, economics and management research
discuss incentive mechanisms generally or selection into these based on personal dispositions without
considering the match with the wider organizational context such as the organizational culture.
In this study we have provided new causal evidence of the importance of person-organization ﬁt (e.g.,
Hoﬀmann and Woehr, 2006; Schneider, 1987) and extend person-organization ﬁt theory by demonstrating
how the eﬀect of person-organization ﬁt on performance is moderated by the incentive structure. In our
experiment subjects are randomly assigned to three alternative priming conditions, proxying exogenous
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variation in organizational values and two alternative incentive conditions. By controlling for pre-elicited
measures of personal preferences as well as measures of personal values, we can study causal interaction
eﬀects of preferences and organizational values on performance in various tournament incentive schemes
(team, individual).
We ﬁnd that when subjects work in teams competing with other teams, there is a strong interaction
between prosocial personal preferences and organizational values - those who are prosocially oriented per-
form signiﬁcantly better and those who are proself oriented perform worse than in the neutral baseline
condition. Thus, our study provides experimental support for the notion that other-regarding orga-
nizational values facilitate team eﬀectiveness (Mathieu et al., 2008), at least for prosocially oriented
individuals. Our ﬁndings are generally in line with the theory we formalize to predict the eﬀect of or-
ganizational values on individual performance contingent on personal preferences. Our theory applies a
variant of the model of in-group favoritism by Chen and Li (2009) capturing the distinction between the
prosocial values of benevolence (regard for the in-group) and universalism (regard for general others) in
the Schwartz (1992, 2007) personal value classiﬁcation.
There are evolutionary reasons to expect that group members are more altruistic to ingroups than
to out-groups. In fact Choi and Bowles (2007) show that a combination of altruism toward ingroups
and hostility toward outgroups is persistent under evolutionary pressures. Such evolutionary arguments
support the theoretical other-regarding preference model that we use. If the prosocial prime impacts the
altruistic concerns for ingroups at a diﬀerent rate (let alone in the opposite direction) than for outgroups,
we should expect priming to generate the observed eﬀects in the teams contest.
Recently, it has been emphasized that more attention should be paid to publication and other biases
that might lead to false positive ﬁndings (e.g., Maniadis et al., 2014). We calculate Cohen's d for the
observed eﬀect of the prosocial prime on prosocial participants (above median dictator giving) yielding a
Cohen's d of 0.47, which is considered a medium eﬀect size (Cohen, 1992). Using a 5% signiﬁcance level,
a sample size of 79 participants in the relevant treatments and the fact that the sample is imbalanced
(35 observations in WE-prime and 44 in N-prime), the power of the t-test of ﬁnding a diﬀerence in eﬀort
between the treatments is 70%. Maniadis et al. (2014) use formal modeling to illustrate how the rate of
false positives depends not only on the observed signiﬁcance level and statistical power but also on the
prior probability of the hypothesis being true, and on the number of independent researchers exploring
the question. Assuming that we are the only research group exploring the above question and using
prior probabilities of 10%, 50%, and 70%, we estimate the post-study probability for a true relationship
being reported as true at 61%, 93% and 97%, respectively (see Equation 2 in Maniadis et al. 2014 for
details). These calculations indicate that our ﬁndings are of practical relevance. Yet, one of the main
conclusions drawn from the analysis in Maniadis et al. (2014) is that replication will quickly reduce the
risk of reporting false positives. We therefore encourage researchers to replicate our study.
Practically, our ﬁndings suggest that organizations characterized by a signiﬁcant presence of prosocial
organizational values and prosocially motivated employees stand to reap measurable productivity gains
from the use of team tournament incentives instead of the more traditionally used individual tourna-
ment incentives. This insight is particularly applicable to public sector, nonproﬁt and social enterprise
organizations, who disproportionately attract and select managers and employees with a strong prosocial
value orientation, other-regarding interests and predisposition to contribute to the public good, relative
to pure for-proﬁt businesses (Buurman et al., 2012; Besley and Ghatak, 2013). At the same time, our
ﬁndings underpin the beneﬁts to these organizations from not only carefully screening new employees for
their prosocial preferences, but also from sustaining and reinforcing incumbent employees' prosocial pref-
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erences (Frey, Homberg and Osterloh, 2013). Having proself individuals working at a prosocial oriented
organization under team tournament incentives eﬀectively backﬁres, resulting in suboptimal performance
by these individuals. It is as if proselfs are then put in a cheater mode, which can be very deterimental
to the organization. By oﬀering lower salaries or through other screening devices, prosocial organizations
can eﬀectively try to deter the 'cheaters' from joining and pretending to be prosocial. Once on the job,
instances when a leader makes personal sacriﬁces (Fehr and Gintis, 2007) or takes hierarchical control
that are executed for the sake of the community rather than selﬁsh interests lead to employee perceptions
of higher organizational support and increased prosocial motivation (Osterloh and Frey, 2013)
The ideas in this paper are also applicable to organizations that are turning away from hierarchical
structures and toward ﬂatter, more group-based structures, that require employees to have increased
interpersonal interaction and rely more on their coworkers (Grant and Berg, 2010). For these organiza-
tions, prosocial motivation may become a more signiﬁcant source of employee motivation, and potentially
play a bigger role in productivity. Our study highlights one speciﬁc strategy to this eﬀect, namely for
organizations to cultivate a more prosocial organizational culture and deploy team tournament incentives.
More implicitly, our ﬁndings subscribe to the notion that coherent managerial decision-making across the
domains of incentive design, recruitment and organizational culture is particularly instrumental to overall
ﬁrm productivity, speciﬁcally when prosocial employee motivations prevail (Ben-Ner, 2012).
While a lab-experimental study can always be criticized for relying heavily on extrapolation from
the lab to the ﬁeld, the methodology avoids some of the weaknesses of previous survey studies in real
organizations (see Vogel and Feldman, 2009, Section 5 for instance). First, the method puts a ﬁrmer
ﬁnger on causation. Second, by means of indirect and direct control, it avoids the potential for an
omitted variable bias often driven by underlying selection eﬀects. For instance, Vogel and Feldman (2009)
point out that some of the beneﬁts of person-organization ﬁt are, in fact, driven by person-vocation ﬁt,
i.e. self-selection of individuals into occupations. Third, our experiment establishes a strong eﬀect on
a behavioral outcome measure, that of performance, the eﬀects on which have been considered to be
weaker and more contestable than those on attitudinal measures in past correlational research (Hoﬀman
and Woehr, 2006). Fourth, we elicit an objective measure of prosocial preferences (dictator game) by
using choices in simple social interactions as proxies. We also have a controlled exogenous variation
in incentives and organizational culture, the two organizational variables of interest. These objective
measures and exogenous variation allow for a more objective identiﬁcation of a match between a person
and an organization.
Finally, we suggest that our study also contains a methodological innovation. Methodologically,
priming has only recently been used in a few pioneering economics experiments (Benjamin et al. 2010;
Ahmed and Salas, 2011; Boschini et al., 2012; see also the brief review in Kamenica, 2012). Our study
can be seen to complement this growing literature. Perhaps the most related study is Drouvelis et al.
(2010) who ﬁnd that, compared to a neutral prime, prosocial priming increases the eﬀort in a one-shot
public goods game. Although their ﬁndings are supportive of ours, we do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence in
average eﬀort between the no priming and the prosocial priming condition - we only ﬁnd the diﬀerential
eﬀect of the prosocial prime on prosocial and proself individuals. However, their study diﬀers from ours in
many aspects: ﬁrst, the public goods game they consider has a diﬀerent strategic structure as compared to
contests. In public good games, the equilibrium eﬀorts are ineﬃciently low whereas, in our case, deviating
and contributing more than in the equilibrium decreases eﬃciency. In public good games, increasing the
eﬀort from equilibrium increases the expected payoﬀs for all other participants, whereas in ours, it has
a positive eﬀect on own team members only and a negative eﬀect on others. Second, they study a one-
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shot interaction whereas we have a repeated situation studying more persistent priming eﬀects. Previous
studies on public goods games exhibit deteriorating contributions over time (Fischbacher and Gächter,
2010), thus validating this concern. Third, they do not control for individual prosocial preferences, which
we show constitute an important moderator of the prosocial priming eﬀect. Rather than public good
provision, the focus of this paper is to consider the contest nature of the workplace in an explicit manner
by comparing the two contest types. These are two related but separate questions due to the very diﬀerent
strategic nature of pure public good provision, and the contests (see Section 2).
Our study also has limitations, which point to fruitful avenues for future research. First, as argued
in the introduction, relative performance incentive schemes are commonplace in organizations, but of
course not omnipresent. To be able to draw more general conclusions about the importance of person-
organization ﬁt in organizations it remains to be seen if our results extend to other incentive schemes
commonly employed; a question we save for future research. Second, as we outline in the introduction,
there is a lack of research using priming to manipulate organizational values. We hope that future reserach
can build on our work and perhaps start to diﬀerentiate the diﬀerent layers of priming eﬀects (e.g. eﬀects
of priming national as opposed to organizational culture) through manipulations checks.
In conclusion, our paper contributes a ﬁrst causal test of person-organization ﬁt theory, thereby re-
aﬃrming its validity. Furthermore, we extend person-organization ﬁt theory by demonstrating that its
eﬀects are contingent on the dominant incentive scheme - and vice versa, that the eﬀectiveness of tour-
nament incentive schemes is contingent on organizational culture and pro-social individual preferences.
Appendix
A1. Descriptives
Table 6 provides pairwise correlations between our elicited measures. These indicate expected positive
associations among the behavioral measures of prosociality, particularly dictator, ultimatum game respon-
der (ultimatre) and trustee in the trust game. These measures also tend to show the expected positive
relationships with benevolence and universalism - the two self-reported values capturing prosociality - as
well as negative correlations with the two self-reported values capturing self-interest (achievement and
power). The correlations among the self-reported values are furthermore consistent with Schwartz' value
theory, in particular benevolence and universalism show high positive correlations with each other, as do
power and achievement; whilst the correlations of prosocial values (universalism and benevolence) are
negatively correlated with achievement and power.
Table 7 shows average values for all personality measures by treatment, together with Kruskall-Wallis
p-values. We note that there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence which indicates that randomization
worked and the prime did not spill over to these measures.
A2. Additional regression results for the team contest.
Table 8 is an extension of Table 2. In this table, where individual eﬀort is the dependent variable, we
add personal-value-orientation measures one-by-one in each of the columns.
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Table 7: Average values of behavioral measures and PVQ-measures by prime. P-values
from the Kruskall-Wallis test
Mean(N) Mean(WE) Mean(ME) p-value
Dictator 0.303 0.301 0.296 0.949
Benevolence 4.561 4.642 4.667 0.638
Universalism 4.196 4.450 4.357 0.070
Achievement 3.959 3.758 3.844 0.361
Power 2.896 2.719 2.807 0.491
Risk 6.453 6.724 6.658 0.560
Trustee 0.289 0.289 0.283 0.996
Trustor 0.562 0.495 0.591 0.512
Ultimateof 0.435 0.437 0.432 0.826
Ultimate 0.324 0.336 0.348 0.646
Table 8: OLS regression adding PVQ-measures one-by-one
Benevolence Universalism Achivement Power
WE -22.34*** -21.72*** -22.19*** -22.10***
[7.280] [7.312] [7.074] [7.187]
ME -4.445 -4.145 -4.246 -4.403
[6.553] [6.563] [6.667] [6.646]
Dictator -5.533 -3.452 -4.874 -4.853
[10.63] [10.12] [10.12] [10.15]
WE×Dictator 64.23*** 62.25*** 63.25*** 62.99***
[16.35] [15.97] [15.45] [15.79]
ME×Dictator 8.028 6.533 6.849 7.250
[16.12] [15.85] [15.96] [15.95]
PVQ-measure 2.322 0.154 -1.272 -1.317
[1.844] [1.777] [1.446] [1.238]
Constant 55.41*** 64.96*** 70.96*** 69.72***
[9.217] [8.924] [7.103] [5.822]
Observations 2,310 2,310 2,310 2,310
Note: Individual eﬀort is the dependent variable. N prime is the baseline.
Robust standard errors in brackets(clustered on the group level). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9 reports the results from OLS regressions, with individual eﬀort as dependent variable, inter-
acting the behavioral measures separately with the priming conditions. In this table the Main coeﬃcient
comes from the main eﬀect of the corresponding column variable (e.g. Dictator). The Interact vari-
able gives the interaction coeﬃcient of the corresponding column variable with respective prime (e.g.
Dictator×ME for the third column).
Table 10 reports the results from OLS regressions, with individual eﬀort as dependent variable, in-
teracting the PVQ-measures separately with the priming conditions. In this table the Main coeﬃcient
comes from the main eﬀect of the corresponding column variable (e.g. Benevolence). The Interact
variable gives the interaction coeﬃcient of the corresponding column variable with respective prime (e.g.
Benevolence×ME for the third column). In Table 11 we report OLS estimations using the pre-elicited
Dictator variable, with individual eﬀort at dependent variable. The number of observations is lower here
since we did not pre-elicit this measure in the 2009 experiments.
A3. Instructions
A3.1. Pre-elicitation Online Questionnaire
We here provide a shortened version of the exact instructions (more details are available from the authors
upon request): This is a study on decision-making behavior and personality. Our study has two parts,
part 1 is this web-based survey, in which you will take part over the next 15 min; part 2 will take place
in about 1 weeks time in [location of lab experiment mentioned]. We ask you to make 14 decisions in
the following survey. Please read the instructions carefully for each of the 14 decisions and then make
your decision. Depending on your decision you can earn money. In particular, we will randomly choose
one of your 14 decisions for actual payment. Your income is calculated in ECU (Experimental Currency
Unit). The amount to be payed to you is the income earned by you in the randomly selected round and
translated as 1000 ECU = 15 Euro. We will pay the money to you, as well as any income you earned
during part 2, after part 2 of the study next week in [name of location]. This was followed by a technical
instruction of how to move through the survey, whom to contact for help and followed by a request to
ﬁll in an anonymous code consisting of the ﬁrst letter of the respondent's mother ﬁrst name, the ﬁrst
letter of her father's name, the second letter of own ﬁrst name, the ﬁrst letter of place of birth and the
last two digits of own year of birth. The second page of the survey asked for a dictator-choice decision
(dividing 444 ECU). The third page had a trust game (from the trustee perspective) and the fourth page
an ultimatum game from the receiver's perspective. On the ﬁfth page, we gave nine questions of the
standard Holt and Laury (2002) risk-aversion measure and the sixth page had the trust game from the
trustor perspective. Then, on the seventh page the ultimatum game was presented from the perspective
of the oﬀers. The eighth page asked for socio-demographic data (year of birth, number of years lived in
the focal country, the highest completed eductional level, area of study and gender). The reference in all
games was 444 ECU. The ﬁnal ninth page thanked respondents for their participation and indicated a
contact email where they could reach the researchers for more information or concerns.
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Table 11: OLS using the pre-elicited Dictator variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
WE -2.205 -2.074 -0.302 -18.28 -26.35*** -26.23***
[3.669] [5.361] [4.847] [11.74] [7.106] [7.400]
ME -2.212 6.005 5.201 5.632 4.852 5.111
[3.668] [4.000] [3.423] [6.044] [5.798] [5.562]
Dictator -4.094 -0.801 -17.59 -16.21 -17.63
[11.36] [11.37] [16.29] [15.32] [15.45]
WE×Dictator 50.97 84.42*** 82.84***
[36.55] [20.04] [20.42]
ME×Dictator 2.005 1.282 0.727
[17.92] [17.15] [16.65]
Benevolence -0.238 -0.117
[2.276] [2.265]
Universalism -0.204 -0.140
[2.914] [2.711]
Achievement -3.944* -3.482
[2.326] [2.183]
Power 2.005 1.737
[1.775] [1.558]
Period -0.357 -0.357 -0.357
[0.321] [0.321] [0.322]
Female 0.763 3.190 3.126
[4.169] [3.843] [4.128]
Risk -2.593* -1.880 -1.887
[1.426] [1.301] [1.303]
Constant 64.61*** 64.08*** 93.43*** 67.98*** 80.05*** 90.19***
[2.075] [3.798] [16.76] [4.751] [8.614] [14.52]
Observations 2,310 1,470 1,440 1,470 1,440 1,440
Note: Individual eﬀort is the dependent variable. N prime is the baseline.
Period is a linear time trend and Female is a dummy indicating the gender of the subject.
Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered on the group level). p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A3.2. Values orientation questionnaire (How similar are you to this person?)
The personal prosocial and proself PVQ-measures were captured with the Portrait Values Questionnaire
(PVQ, Schwartz et al., 1999; Schwartz et al., 2001). The PVQ has been widely used in diﬀerent contexts
and shows good psychometric qualities. Psychometric quality refers to the measurement reliability of a
self-reported measure in, e.g. psychological research. It is typically estimated with a Cronbach alpha
coeﬃcient (e.g., DeVellis, 1991). Cronbach Alpha reliabilities for the present sample were .80 for univer-
salism (6 items) and .62 for benevolence (4 items), .87 for achievement (4 items) and .78 for power (3
items). The PVQ presents subjects with short portrayals of diﬀerent people, each describing an individ-
ual's goals, aspirations, or wishes that implicitly point at the importance of a single value type (Schwartz
et al., 2001). For example, It is important to Z to be rich. Z wants to have a lot of money and expensive
things. (power) or E thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. E wants
justice for everybody, even for people E doesn't know (universalism). Following the protocol of the PVQ,
proself orientation was captured with seven such statements (three capturing power, four achievement)
and prosocial orientation with ten statements (four for benevolence and six for universalism). Statements
were presented in random order. Subject rated the portrayals in response to the question How much like
you is this person? on the following scale very much like me, like me, somewhat like me, a little
like me, not like me, and not like me at all. Answers were coded 6 (very much like me) to 1 (not like
me at all) and mean sum scores were calculated for the corresponding items per value.
A4. The experimental procedure
In our ﬁrst sessions in 2009 we ran the competing teams treatment with prosocial and proself priming
of organizational culture. In those sessions, we only had one behavioral measure of prosociality elicited
before the contests, namely the dictator game. The data conﬁrmed our hypothesis. This encouraged us
to continue with a full-scale design where both competing teams and competing individuals tournaments
were used, where (in addition to prosocial and proself priming) also a neutral priming benchmark was
introduced. We also included further behavioral measures of prosociality in addition to the dictator game,
such as the trust game and the ultimatum game (see Section 5.2), which were elicited 1 1/2 weeks prior
to the experiment.
In April 2011, in our ﬁrst larger-scale attempt, we again found support for our main hypothesis. Yet,
the reliability of the data was questionable due to the high rate of subjects who understood the purpose
of the priming. We conjectured that the failure was due to the similarity of the words in the pre-elicited
values questionnaire and in the word-scrambles used in the priming of organizational values. Therefore,
we decided to exclude the April 2011 sample from our analyses.
In July 2011, we ran the main sessions where the pre-elicited values questionnaire was abandonned.
Only behavioral measures for other-regarding concerns were elicited beforehand. The fraction of subjects
who understood the purpose of the priming was much lower in these sessions.
The July 2011 sessions constitute our main data set. The timeline of our 2011 July experiments was
as follows.
1. Pre-elicitation (1 1/2 weeks prior to the experiment): dictator game, trust game, ultimatum game,
risk-preferences (Holt and Laury, 2002).
2. ... 1 1/2 weeks passed
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3. Subjects came to the laboratory
4. Those who had not completed the pre-questionnaire were set at the back of the queue.
5. Identity was veriﬁed.
6. Random seating number was drawn.
7. Instructions were distributed upside down. When everyone had their instructions, subjects were
asked to turn them around, read them through carefully, and raise their hand if they had any
questions.
8. Once the instructions had been read, the subjects retrieved their personal codes, which they had
generated when answering the online pre-elicitation over the internet, and were asked to enter their
personal code on the screen of the computer.
9. Subjects then started ﬁlling out the word puzzle sheet, which served both as priming the orga-
nizational culture and as a language test. Subjects were asked to raise their hand when done.
Experimenters veriﬁed that the puzzles were correctly ﬁlled out. (In July 2011, all word puzzles
were competently completed - we had reserved extra subjects as substitutes if the language skills
had not turned out to be suﬃcient. As discussed in Section 4.4. in the 2009 session three subjects
were substituted.).
10. When two thirds of the subjects had completed the word puzzle, the on-screen contest experiment
was started. Each subject was required to ﬁll out the scramble sheet before starting with the
onscreen experiment.
11. After 10 rounds of contest, the subjects received a funneled questionnaire enquiring into what the
participants considered the purpose of the study to be . This standard questionnaire in priming
experiments was used to check whether subjects understoond the purpose of the priming task and
whether the priming task might have inﬂuenced their behavior (Bargh and Chartrand, 2000).
12. An on-screen personal value questionnaire was ﬁlled out (the self-enhancement and self-transcendence
items of the PVQ, Schwartz et al., (2001), see Appendix A3.2).
13. The incentivized behavioral tasks were completed (dictator, ultimatum, trust game, risk preferences
- i.e. the same elements that had been pre-elicited 1 1/2 weeks prior to coming to the lab).
14. Public transparent lotteries were run to randomly draw the payoﬀ relevant tasks (one lottery for the
pre-elicitation task and another for the laboratory tasks) and the lottery outcomes in risk preference
tasks. (One subject was asked to come forward and verify the numbering of table tennis balls that
were thereafter placed in an urn. The subject ﬁrst drew a ball that determined the task that was to
be paid out. If the task involved exogenous uncertainty (risk-preference measures), another draw
was carried out with needed a replacement of table tennis balls.)
The average duration of a session was 1h 10 minutes without payout procedures and 1h 35 minutes
until the last subject had received the remuneration. The temperature in the lab was set to 22*C. The
curtains were drawn. There was always the same experimenter and two helpers such that we had a
balanced sample when it comes to experimenter eﬀects. The main sessions were carried out Mon-Fri,
at 10h and at 13h each day. Competing teams sessions were always at 13h and competing individual
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sessions at 10h. One neutral priming teams session took place on Tue at 16h and one neutral priming
teams session on Wed at 16h.
Psychology students were excluded since they are likely to be familiar with priming studies. Also
those with any previous participation in priming experiments were excluded.
The procedures used in the collection of the data in May 2009 were identical to the procedures just
described apart from the following points:
1. There was no pre-elicitation of behavioral measures of personal values 1 1/2 weeks before the lab
experiment.
2. The dictator-variable was elicited as the ﬁrst task in the lab, before handing out the instructions
(after stage 6 and before stage 7 above). The dictator game was considered to be an additional
round of the contest when randomly drawing one of the rounds as the payoﬀ-relevant one. The
amount shared in the dictator game was 1000 ECUs as opposed to the 444 ECUs in the 2011
experiment. Therefore, we normalized the dictator variable so that it varied between 0 (nothing
given to the other) and 1 (everything given to the other). The distribution of normalized dictator
giving in 2009 is not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from the distribution of 2011.
3. The Holt-Laury risk aversion measure was elicited immediately after the tournament rounds. The
proportions of the stakes in the lotteries were identical to the stakes in the 2011 sessions but
somewhat larger in absolute terms. The choice distributions in the 2011 and 2009 experiments are
not statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
4. The ultimatum game and trust game choices were not elicited in 2009. These were added to check
the robustness of our results and to have a more comprehensive set of proxies for other-regarding
concerns (see Section 5.2).
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